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ABSTRACT 
The paper studies the process of PPP formation on the suburban passenger 
transport in Russia. Empirical evidence on the nature of relationship between 
local authorities and regional railway undertakings has been provided to 
rationalise basic assumptions made in the theoretical model. The theoretical 
findings show that PPP arrangement provides better incentives to invest in quality 
of services though direct welfare comparison with Compensatory Agreements is 
not possible due to different objectives of the parties. 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of flexible institutional arrangements of effective public transport 
service provision has been well documented in both theoretical and empirical literature. 
The authorities worldwide seek for the delivery mechanisms that would tie the service 
provider objectives to public policy needs while maintaining incentives to innovate. A 
potential conflict of interests between public purchaser and private provider of transport 
services may at least partially be smoothed if they co-operate at the tactical level and 
build a partnership relationship. Among a number of requirements for such a partnering 
summarized by Stanley and Hensher (2008) are: common objectives, agreed governance 
arrangements and risk-sharing rules (see also Medda, 2007; Nisar, 2007 and Sock-Yong 
Phang, 2007), relationship management, trust, transparency and accountability. In 
practice, the idea of strategic and tactical level co-operation can be realized in the form 
of public-private partnership (PPP). 
In this light the ongoing reform of suburban railway transport in Russia provides a 
relevant case study material to confront these findings with the experience of creation of 
Suburban Passenger Companies (SPCs) in the form of joint ventures between local 
authorities and regional divisions of Russian Railways (RZD). This specific form of 
PPP aims at internalizing the conflicting objectives of the public partner (local 
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authorities) and RZD that is 100% state-owned joint-stock company but may be viewed 
as profit-maximizing private agent. The contradiction results from the fact that local 
authorities de-jure have Public Service Obligation (PSO) to provide transportation 
services but have very limited budgets to fully finance the purchase of such a services 
from the monopoly operator which is regional division of RZD. Local authorities can 
influence the regulator’s decision to set tariffs at the ‘socially acceptable’ level which is 
often can’t cover cost incurred by RZD. Moreover, numerous passengers eligible for 
federal and regional benefits when traveling on suburban trains enjoy concessionary 
fares by law. However, only 40 (as of July 2009) of 73 regions with suburban railway 
transport have signed the agreements to at least partially compensate RZD losses from 
the tariff regulation.  
Such a ‘Compensatory Agreements’ appeared to be incomplete from the contractual 
point of view and poorly enforced. In the absence of clear procedures for cost structure 
determination on the railway transport in Russia local authorities may not trust the 
information on cost reported by RZD. Federal concessionary passengers started to be 
compensated by the Federal Agency for Healthcare and Social Development in 2005. At 
a local level only 14 regions agreed to fully compensate for the concessions determined 
locally. This form of PPP (viewed as default option) predictably resulted in the constant 
negotiations with low incentives to invest in the sector for both parties. Not surprisingly, 
the majority of regions have demonstrated low interest in sharing the losses with RZD. 
Agreement has been reached on at least partial local support in a few areas (Moscow 
and some others), but has not been reached in most areas because of a lack of funding at 
the local level.  
The alternative to Compensatory Agreements was the establishment SPCs. 11 regions 
have formed SPCs with RZD so far and 4 new SPCs are to be established in the nearest 
future. Some of them managed to turn to profitability within two or three years after 
establishment, all of them improved quality of services. If such a form of PPP proves to 
perform better in terms of financial result and quality of services why not implement it 
economy wide? Are there any regional factors that make railway undertaking of any 
form profitable or this result is attributed to the establishment of joint venture? What 
theory tells us about parties’ incentives to form such a partnership and why the 
corporate structure of created SPCs varies across regions?  
To address at least part of these questions we build a model which captures the basic 
stylized facts of the PPP creation process in Russia to be able to make the results policy 
relevant. The modeling framework inherits the tradition in the growing literature on PPP 
(eg. Hart, 2003; Bennett and Iossa, 2006a,b; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008) by 
considering the possibility of bundling the investment and operational stages of public 
project. Providing a useful analytical tool this literature cannot give a direct answer to 
the questions of interest. To address these issues we first describe the relevant features 
of the Compensatory Agreements and PPP practices in Russian suburban rail passenger 
transport and built a theoretical model of PPP to compare the incentives of the partners 
under alternative schemes. Then we discuss the findings of the model in terms of policy 
recommendations that might be derived from the theoretical analysis. 
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THE STORY 
 
The decade of railway passenger transport reform in Russia has witnessed a decrease by 
36.5% of suburban passenger km. In 2008 about 1.2 billion trips were made by 
suburban rail passengers 73 Russian regions. As a result revenues from suburban 
passenger transportation has been decreasing for the last 4 years while costs continued 
to grow resulting in very unpleasant dynamics of losses which increased from 20.5 bln 
rubles in 2005 to 34.8 bln rubles in 2008 (see Fig.1). 
 
Figure 1: Financial result of suburban rail passenger transport in Russia 
To large extent the very nature of suburban transportation by rail to be loss-making is 
inherited from the Soviet times when the Ministry of Railway Transport on behalf of the 
state supplied this service as a public service. Various categories of subsidized 
passengers were allowed to travel for free. Social attitude towards transportation as a 
public service coupled with very limited investment in the fare control mechanisms 
(ticket inspectors, entry-exit tourniquets, video cameras, etc.) resulted in the significant 
scope of fare evasion that ranges across regions from 10% to 40%. Moreover in 2003 in 
line with the structural reform plan) all the state functions (including the right of ticket 
inspectors to control passengers) were transferred from MPS to local authorities. Being 
a 100% state-owned joint stock company Russian Railways has no legal right to 
monitor and enforce fare collection on the route. As a result the loss-making suburban 
passenger transport in Russia is cross-subsidized by the freight transport. 
40 regions out of 73 agreed on procedures to gradually increase at least partial 
compensation of reported RZD losses from their budgets. In practice so called 
Compensatory Agreements demonstrated very poor incentives of local authorities to 
comply with the signed contracts. The amount of compensation has been always a 
subject of constant negotiations. Since the cost structure of RZD is poorly verified local 
authorities may not fully trust the data provided by monopoly. For instance the scope of 
fare evasion may turn out to be debatable though play significant role in tariff 
determination at regional level. Local authorities taking into account political and social 
considerations can influence regional regulators’ decision to set tariff at the level below 
cost. Such an inconsistent tariff policy may benefit short-term oriented policymakers at 
the local level since lower fares increase the consumption of public service and 
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consequently social benefit at the expense of greater losses of RZD. Naturally, RZD has 
been attempting to put every effort to discipline local authorities. One of the possible 
mechanism of enforcement developed by RZD was establishment of PPP with local 
authorities in the form of joint venture. 
The process of creation of joint venture companies for operating suburban and regional 
rail passenger undertakings was started in 1998 when ongoing structural railway reform 
had not been initiated (the three-stage reform plan was officially approved in May 
2001)
Table 1: Share structure of suburban passenger companies in Russia 
. In March 2006 the Federal Government established the licensing procedures for 
these or any new companies to become operators. By the end of 2008 11 SPCs in 73 
regions were established in the form of joint venture between RZD and local and 
regional authorities. The corporate structure (see Table 1) of these companies varies 
across regions but the dominant role of RZD prevails in the majority of them.  
N
o. 
Year of 
establish. Company Name Share Structure 
1 1998 Express-Prigorod RZD (51%), Novosibirsk region (39,8%), Novosibirsk city (9,2%) 
2 2003 Kuzbass-Prigorod RZD (51%),  Kemerovo region (49%) 
3 2003 Omsk-Prigorod RZD (51%),  Omsk region (49%) 
4 2003 Altay-Prigorod RZD (51%),  Altayskiy Kray (49%) 
5 2005 Central SPC 
RZD (49,34) 
Moscow City (25,33%),  
Moscow region (25,33%) 
6 2005 Krasprigorod RZD (51%),  SOE "Center for transport logistic" (49%) 
7 2005 Express Primoriya RZD (51%),  Primorskiy Kray (49%) 
8 2005 Sverdlovsk SPC RZD (51%),  Sverdlovsk region (49%) 
9 2006 Nord-West SPC RZD (75% - 1share), St. Petersburg (25% + 1share) 
10 2006 Volgogradtransprigorod RZD (51%), Volgograd region (49%) 
11 2006 Don-Prigorod RZD (75% - 1share), SOE "Rostovdorsnab"" (25%  + 1 share) 
12 2009* Moscow-Tver SPC RZD (50% - 2 shares), JSC «Delta-Trans-Invest» (25% + 1share), Tver region (25%  + 1share) 
13 2009* Volgo-Vyatskaya SPC RZD (50% - 2 shares), Nizhny Novgorod region (25%  + 1share)and Kirov region (25%  + 1share) 
14 2009* Permskaya SPC RZD (51%), Permskiy kray (49%) 
15 2009* Sodrugestvo RZD (50% - 2 shares), Republic of Tatarstan (25%  + 1share) and Udmurtiya  (25%  + 1share) 
 
Why local authorities partner with regional railways in Russia? 5 
THE MODEL 
The following section presents a formal model where the idea of PPP creation is 
captured by the different objective functions of the partners under two alternative 
schemes: Compensatory Agreement and PPP. The later attempts at internalizing the 
conflict between local authorities and RZD that would be a pre-requisite for the further 
development of their relationship towards trysting partnership. 
Social Benefit 
The gross benefit of the society is modeled by the function: )()()(0 evauqBB ++= , 
where )(0 qB  states for consumer surplus indicating passengers utility derived from 
suburban transportation. To capture the idea that society is better-off when more 
passengers are transported by rail we assume the scalability of this public project. In 
particular we extend the functional form of B  used in Bennett and Iossa (2006) and 
require that greater demand increases social benefits, 00 >∂∂ qB , but at a decreasing 
rate, 020
2 <∂∂ qB .  
We also borrow from PPP literature the idea that quality of public services positively 
affects social welfare while the quality itself may be improved by greater investment in 
infrastructure, a , and/or by more efforts, e , exerted at the operational level. We 
normalize the cost of one unit of a or e  as unity; and can speak of them as 
‘technological’ and ‘organizational’ innovations correspondingly. One might think of a  
as investment in modern, more comfortable and faster rolling stock; modernization of 
railroad stations; etc. In turn, higher efforts of an agent operating the project may, for 
instance, result in cleaner stations, better ticketing service, availability of ancillary 
businesses (like selling food/newspapers to passengers or retailing at railroad stations), 
etc. Thus, the social value of quality improvement would be )()( evau + . 
Cost structure 
The project cost function )()(),(0 eaeqCC ψφ ++=  can be divided into two parts: the 
first one ),(0 eqC  represents variable cost, that rises with quantity at an increasing rate: 
00 >∂∂ qC , 0
2
0
2 >∂∂ qC , while the second one )()( ea ψφ +  can be perceived as 
operational cost of quality improvement. We follow Laffont and Tirole (1993) to 
assume that efforts (or organizational innovations) can decrease variable cost, 
00 <∂∂ eC , at the expense of fixed costs. Namely )(eψ  is associated with disutility of 
efforts for managers; the standard assumptions here imply 0)0( =ψ , 0>dedψ , 
022 <ded ψ . Infrastructural investment )(aφ  is modeled by concave function with 
0>dadφ , 022 <dad φ . 
Let 
q
eaeqCAC )()(),(0 ψφ ++=  be the average cost of the project.  
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To capture the idea that the projects deals with regional natural monopoly we consider 
only the downward sloping part of the average cost function with 0<∂∂ qAC  and 
022 >∂∂ qAC . 
Demand function 
To account for the heterogeneity of passengers and be able to study possible 
distributional effects we consider three different groups: obedient, fare-dodgers and 
concessionary passengers. Passengers from the first group perceive that the probability 
of being caught if they travel for free is high. Being risk-averse and homogeneous 
within the group they pay tariff T  and if it doesn’t exceed their reservation price, 
otherwise they choose alternative transportation mode. The second group apparently 
comprises of risk-lovers with propensity to travel for free equal to γ  who don’t pay for 
tickets. They perceive that expected penalty levied by ticket inspector if they are caught 
is low and prefer to play such a lottery with the state.  
The propensity to free-ride γ  appears to be a composite characteristic reflecting risk-
aversion of the population to free-ride. Higher level of supervision by ticket inspectors 
decreases γ  (the inclination to travel for free), as well as higher penalties and public 
intolerance towards ticketless passengers. Lower propensity to travel for free decreases 
the pool of fare dodgers who may either join the first group or switch to another mode 
of transportation (where such a lottery is not that costly). We model this idea by 
assuming the following functional form: )0,(),1( 21 γγ qTq +− , where ),1(1 Tq γ−  is 
demand of obedient passengers and )0,(2 γq  is demand of free-riders.  
The third group of concessionary passengers (war veterans, children, students, etc.) 
have socially based ticket privileges and pay T)1( β−  for their trip, where β  is the size 
of concession. We also assume that discount β  is sufficient to guarantee that 
concessionary passengers have no incentives to free-ride (and have 0=γ ). Thus the 
total demand can be expressed as: ))1(,0()0,(),1( 321 TqqTqq βγγ −++−= . Obviously  
0)0,(
)1(
),1( 21 >
∂
∂
+
−∂
−∂
−=
∂
∂
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
qTqq , 
that is higher propensity to travel for free increases total demand and, as will be shown 
below, increases social benefit. 
We suppose that improvements in the quality of services resulted in either technological 
or organizational innovations may attract extra passengers on the railroad. Therefore the 
demand of each group of passengers is assumed to be quality sensitive: 
0,, 321 >
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
e
q
e
q
e
q ; 0,, 321 >
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
a
q
a
q
a
q . 
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Strategic variables 
The government (or local authorities) may wish to impose a certain level of control to 
increase the probability of fare-dodgers detection. The government expenditure on 
hiring k  ticket inspectors is )(kG , where 0>dkdG . Naturally, the propensity to free 
ride decreases with the level of supervision 0<∂∂ kγ . Since passengers from the first 
and the third groups only pay for their tickets additional number of ticket inspectors 
may ring about an increase in total revenues but total demand for transportation will be 
lower: 0<
∂
∂
×
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
k
q
k
q γ
γ
. 
Another strategic variable, investment, is controlled by the operator. It consists of two 
parts: aII += 0 , where 0I  is viewed at this stage as positive constant and considered to 
be sunk. We incorporate this variable to model the strategic behavior under binding 
budget constraint. As described above a  stands for investment in quality.  
First-best 
Social welfare can be viewed as unweighted sum of consumer and producer surpluses. 
When we abstract from the shadow cost of public funds the social optimum is derived 
from the following maximization problem: )(max
,,
GICB
kea
−−−  
The first-best optimum level of control variables are as follows: 0=FBk , 0>FBe , and 
0>FBa  (hereinafter the proof of all propositions is derived in the Appendix).  
Compensatory agreements 
To model current situation described above as ‘compensatory agreement’ which 
obviously lacks basic features of trusting partnership we need to assume specific 
principal–agent relations between local authorities (who also have a certain regulatory 
power) and operator (who’s cost cannot be verified in a reliable manner). 
Tariff setting 
The current regulatory approach to setting tariffs for the suburban rail transport is 
mainly cost-based. In particular, local authorities set such a tariff to cover average cost. 
However, since they cannot perfectly estimate the number of fare-dodgers they may be 
reluctant to cover the costs associated with the transportation of this group of 
passengers. In other words the immanent information asymmetry between regulator and 
operator prevents the principal from setting economically sound tariff.  
We don’t focus in this paper on regulatory issues and are not looking for the optimal 
tariff. The crucial point here is that neither tariff alone nor tariff plus compensation M  
can fully cover the operator’s cost. We capture this idea by the following specification. 
The tariff is set by the regulator without taking into account costs incurred by the 
operator when supplying services to free-riders: 
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)()1( 3131 qqCMTqTq +=+−+ β , where the compensation for concessionary 
passengers is calculated as 3qTM ⋅⋅= β . That is  
)))1(,0(),1(()( 31 TqTqACqACT p βγ −+−== . 
Players’ objectives 
The status-quo can be characterized by two different objective functions that local 
authorities (the principal) and operator have. It is common for the regulatory literature 
to assume that the principal may wish to put lower weight 10 ≤≤ µ  on the producer’s 
surplus. All infrastructure investments are made by the operator (the agent) and 
financed from non-budgetary sources. So the principal put zero weight on I . On the 
contrary, all the controlling functions (and associated expenditures G ) are fully 
attributed to the principal. As a result we have the following specification: 
The principal’s objective is: ))())1(((max 31 GMMTqTqBk −++−−+− πµβ , where 
))1(( 31 TqTqB β−+−  is the net consumer benefit, CTqTq −−+= 31 )1( βπ  is the net 
producer surplus, and M  is the size of compensation that operator receives from the 
local government to cover the cost of transportation of concessionary passengers. 
The agent’s objective is: 0)()()(max 02, <−−++−=−+ aIqCqqCIM ppea π , which is 
equivalent to aIqCqqC ppea ++−+ 02, )()(min . 
Private-public partnership 
We consider the particular type of Public-Private-Partnership which takes the form of 
joint venture between local authorities and operator. The corporate structure of the 
company reflects the bargaining power of the parties. Namely, share λ  belongs to local 
authorities and )1( λ−  is controlled by the operator.  
Tariff setting 
Since information asymmetry between the parties (who cooperate now) is lower the 
total demand (and probably total cost) can be observed by local authorities directly. 
Indeed, both ticket sellers and ticket inspectors which can be legally hired now by PPP 
may increases the local authorities’ awareness of the scope of free-riding. Having 
regulatory power they have now more reasons to set tariff that covers total operational 
cost (but not investment or other strategic expenditures). So, tariff setting rule is now: 
)()( 321 qqqACqACT ++== . 
Common objectives 
The objective function of established PPP accounts for the fact that local authorities 
care about consumer surplus, MqqTB −−+− ))1(( 31 β , while operator votes for higher 
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profit and full compensation for the concessionary passengers, M+π . Both parties are 
assumed now to control strategic variables )(kG  and I , so the aggregate objective 
function becomes: }))(1()))1((({max 31,, GIMMqqTBeak −−+−+−−+− πλβλ ,  
))(())1()(()()1( 323213131 qqqACqqqqqqACqCTqTq βββπ +−=−−−−+=−−+= . 
The size of compensation that government pays to operator for concessionary 
passengers 33 )( qqACqTM ⋅⋅=⋅⋅= ββ . Hence, )(2 qACqM ⋅−=+π . 
Thus the common objective function of PPP becomes: 
))()21()(max()))(21()((max
)))(1())(((max
2,,
,,
GIqACqCBGIMCB
GIMCMB
eak
eak
−−⋅⋅−−−=−−+−+−=
=−−+−+++−
λλπλλ
πλπλ
When the share of local authorities in PPP 5.0<λ , 021 >− λ , that is if PPP is 
controlled by the operator minimization of the scope of free-riding 2q  becomes an 
important factor for the PPP strategy. 
DISCUSSION 
Organizational and technological innovations 
Apparently the alternative organizational structures cannot be directly compared in 
terms of social welfare criterion because players change their objective functions when 
PPP is formed. However, one may be interested in the incentives to make organizational 
and technological innovations by comparing optimum },{ ae  under alternative 
institutional arrangements and the first best benchmark case },{ FBFB ae . Several 
propositions follow from the model described in the previous section. 
Proposition 1. Compensatory agreements imply lower level of organizational and 
technological innovations than PPP which in turn below socially optimum level. 
Minimum level of innovations may be normalized to zero, though in practice there may 
be some lower bound that is guaranteed by minimum quality standards. The idea here is 
that compensatory agreements provide no incentives for agent to put any effort above 
this level. Since the quality of services in the model is determined by the level 
innovations establishment of PPP may lead to better quality of services. At the same 
time socially optimal level of organizational and infrastructure innovations is not 
achieved under PPP structure. 
Empirical evidence of PPP creation in the form of joint ventures between local 
authorities and RZD supports this finding. For instance, Central SPC in Moscow region 
invested in new rolling stock, railway stations, etc. and demonstrated average annual 
growth of passengers of 9% for the last 4 years.  
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Investment in law enforcement 
The scope of fare evasion on the suburban passenger transport in Russian makes the 
consideration of investment in law enforcement technologies (modeled for simplicity 
sake as a number of ticket inspectors on the railroad) very important. Under 
compensatory agreements local authorities may have mixed incentives concerning 
implementation of the level of control. On the one hand, increase in the level of control 
means that a number of obedient passengers increases as well. However the effect on 
the total demand and as a consequence on the gross welfare is negative. We begin with 
the analysis of how change in the level of control affects tariffs. 
Proposition 2. Under Compensatory Agreements tariffs decrease with the level of 
control. On the contrary under PPP arrangement, greater control leads to greater tariffs. 
The first part of this proposition states that under Compensatory Agreements  tariff and 
the level of control move in different directions. This result is explained by two facts. 
First of all, fare-dodgers are not included into tariff determination therefore the quantity 
which is perceived by the government as an actual quantity for the tariff determination 
increases since part of free-riders move into the obedient subgroup. Secondly, suburban 
transport is natural monopoly therefore AC decreases with increasing quantity. 
The second part of the proposition examines tariff’s behavior under PPP regime. It is 
opposite to the result for the Compensatory Agreements that is explained by the fact 
that now fare-dodgers are accounted for tariff determination and increase in control 
negatively affects their number. This result seems to be interesting because it basically 
states that given the average cost pricing rule more accurate determination of total 
number of passengers leads to change in response of tariff to the level of control. Now 
we move to determination of optimal level of control under different regimes. 
Proposition 3. Under Compensatory Agreements the optimal level of control is zero 
and equal to the first-best level of control. Under PPP arrangement the level of control 
decreases with the share of local authorities in PPP.  
The first part of this proposition basically states that under Compensatory Agreements 
principal has no incentives to implement positive level of control since it decreases 
demand and therefore decreases consumer’s benefits as well as welfare function since 
the consumer surplus is weighted with higher weight than producer surplus. 
The second part of this proposition states that bargaining power of local authorities to 
maximize net consumer benefits under PPP regime increases with their share in PPP. 
On the contrary RZD has incentives to increase level of control and PPP arrangement 
could allow it to vote for such a policy at the shareholders’ meeting. 
As was mentioned above the direct welfare comparison of Compensatory Agreements 
and PPP is not possible due to different objective functions of the agents. However, 
some conclusions can be reached regarding the incentives of local authorities to create 
PPP.  
Proposition 4. Local authorities can either benefit or lose when switching from 
Compensatory Agreements to PPP. Regional railways win from PPP creation in any 
case. 
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Consumers’ welfare can change in either direction after PPP creation because PPP 
creation does not only lead to increase in quality of services but also implies change in 
tariffs and movement of consumers from one subgroup to another (e.g. fare-dodgers 
start to pay for their tickets) and increase in tariffs.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper studies the effect that the establishment of a specific form of partnership 
between local authorities and regional railways. The main focus of this research was to 
understand how change of institutional arrangements affects the economic incentives to 
innovate. Firstly, this paper concludes that under Compensatory Agreements RZD 
minimizes technological and organizational innovations, because efforts create disutility 
for RZD and also increases quantity demanded. At the same time, tariffs are lower than 
economically sound therefore RZD has no incentives to encourage the demand for 
transportation by quality improvement. Under PPP arrangement both levels of 
technological and organizational innovations become positive resulting in better quality 
of services.  
Under Compensational Agreements the increase in the level of control (greater number 
of ticket inspectors) decreases the tariff because higher level of control implies higher 
demand from obedient passengers. Since suburban transport is a natural monopoly, 
average cost decreases therefore the tariff (which is set at the level of average cost) 
decreases. Under PPP arrangement greater level of control leads to greater tariff. 
The incentives of local authorities to partner with regional railways depend on a number 
of factors, such as: state of the regional budget, rail mode share in suburban 
transportation marker, preferences of the passengers (in particular how they value the 
quality of services) that also varies across regions.  
Among possible extensions of the analysis there are: incorporation of the shadow cost 
of public funds, cost asymmetry and budget constraints. 
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APPENDIX 
First-best 
Let’s find first-best conditions. They are characterized by )(max
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Consider optimal level of efforts: 
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Thus the optimum level of e  is implied by: 
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the functional forms we assumed e  should be strictly positive. QED. 
Consider optimal level of infrastructure investment: 
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1)( 00 . Thus 0>a . 
QED. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Organizational innovations 
Consider the agent’s objective function under compensatory scheme. 
0)()( 02 <−−++−=−+ aIqCqqCIM ppπ , where pq - demand of the first and the 
third group of passengers. The agent’s objective function is equivalent to 
aIqCqqC pp ++−+ 02 )()(min . By differentiating with respect to e  we obtain:  
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As 020
2 >∂∂ qC , pqqqqqq ≡+>++ 31321 , and having in mind that 00 >∂∂ qC , 
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2 >∂∂ qC , 0,, 321 >
∂
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q , we obtain: 
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Note that first-best level of efforts is determined by equation: 
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Obviously the first-best e  is positive. Therefore under compensatory scheme agent puts 
less effort than socially optimal.  
Now consider the optimum level of efforts for the PPP structure.  
The objective of PPP can be written as ))()21()(max( 2 GIqACqCB −−⋅⋅−−− λλ  
Let’s differentiate this function with respect to e : 
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negative or positive. So, the sign of 
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e
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∂
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×
)()( 22  can’t be determined 
analytically and depends on concrete functions of 321 ,, qqq .  
Let’s put the first-best level of efforts into the derivative of the PPP’s objective function 
with respect to the level of efforts. 
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From the analyses of first-best conditions we know that 0)( =
∂
−∂
FBee
CBλ . Hence,  
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and can have any sign. Under certain assumptions, the level of efforts under PPP regime 
PPPe  corresponds to the first-best level FBe . In general, 
))()(()21()( 22 e
qACq
e
qqAC
e
CB
∂
∂
×+
∂
∂
××−−
∂
−∂ λλ  is expected to be positive while 
there may be the case where it is negative for any e . Thus it can be concluded that PPPe  
may be either positive or zero. 
Technological innovations 
Let’s take the first derivative of this function with respect to a . Analogically, we get 
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As 0<∂∂ qAC , 00 >∂∂ qC , 0
2
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2 >∂∂ qC , 0,, 321 >
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
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∀
a
q
a
q
a
q . 
So optimal for agent level of infrastructure investment is 0. 
Note that equation that determines the socially optimal level of infrastructure 
investments - 
da
d
da
du
a
q
q
C
q
B φ
+=+
∂
∂
×
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
1)( 00  implies that socially optimal level of a  
is positive. So, under current situation agent under invests in infrastructure investments. 
Now consider PPP regime. 
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The sign of expression below is ambiguous: 
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therefore the expression 
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can be either positive or negative therefore PPPa  can correspond to FBa  in any way. 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
By differentiating q and T with respect to k we obtain: 
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Since 0
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−∂
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γ
γ Tq , 0<
∂
∂
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∂
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Now consider the PPP case. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
Consider the principal objective function in current situation. 
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Let’s find the optimal for principal level k  in current situation. For the later analyses 
let’s denote optimal for current situation level of control as Ck  
Now consider )()( pqCqC − . Let’s differentiate this expression with respect to k . 
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From the analyses above we know that 021 >
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Let’s differentiate the objective function with respect to k . 
dk
dG
k
qCqC
k
q
q
qCqB
dk
dG
k
qCqC
k
qCqB
k
qCqCqCGqB
p
pp
−
∂
−∂
×−+
∂
∂
×
∂
−∂
=
=−
∂
−∂
×−+
∂
−∂
=
∂
−×−+−−∂
))()((
)1())()((
))()((
)1())()((
)))()(()1()()((
µ
µ
µ
From the analyses of first-best, 0))()(( <
∂
∂
×
∂
−∂
k
q
q
qCqB  
By definition 0>
dk
dG . 
From the analyses above, 0
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Thus, 0
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<
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k
qCqCqCGqB pµ  hence 0== FBC kk  
Consider the optimal for PPP level of control. 
Let’s differentiate the objective function of PPP with respect to k . 
Why local authorities partner with regional railways in Russia? 19 
))()(()21()(
))((
)21()(
))()21()((
2
2
22
k
q
q
qACq
k
q
qAC
k
GCB
k
qACq
k
GCB
k
GIqACqCB
∂
∂
×
∂
∂
×+
∂
∂
××−−
∂
−−∂
=
=
∂
×∂
×−−
∂
−−∂
×=
∂
−−××−−−∂
λλ
λλ
λλ
 
Consider 
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From the analyses of first-best, 0)( <
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GCB . Hence there may be 2 cases. The first 
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In this case 0=> FBPPP kk . The second case is where 
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0== FBPPP kk . We do not consider the third case where 
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assumptions on the behavior of functions which are used in this expression. 
To sum up, under PPP regime the optimal level of control may be positive or zero 
depending on concrete functions. 
An interesting observation concerning the share of principal in PPP. 
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So, with increase in λ  the derivative of the objective function of PPP with respect to k  
decreases. To put it in other words, with increase of share of LA in PPP the chance of 
positive optimal k  decreases (that is the chance of 
))()(()21()( 22 k
q
q
qACq
k
qqAC
k
GCB
∂
∂
×
∂
∂
×+
∂
∂
××−−
∂
−−∂ λλ  being positive 
decreases). 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Analyses of consumers preferences. 
Consumer’s preferences area is represented by the benefits function. 
))1(()()()( 310 qqTevauqBB β−+−++=  
Let’s find the difference between the net consumer’s surplus in PPP and Compensatory 
Arrangements. 
Dementiev A. 20 
))()(())()((
)))1(()(()))1((()((
)))1(())1(((
))()(())()(())()((
310310
3131
00
CSPPPCSPPP
CSCSCSCSPPPPPPPPPPPP
CSCSCSPPPPPPPPP
CSPPPCSPPPCSPPP
evevauau
qqTqBqqTqB
qqTqqT
evevauauqBqBB
−+−+
+−+−−−+−=
=−+−−+−
−−+−+−=∆
ββ
ββ
 
)()( CSPPP auau ≥  since CSPPP aa ≥ . Analogically )()( CSPPP evev ≥  since CSPPP ee ≥ . 
Consider total differential of quantity when we move from Compensatory 
Arrangements to PPP regime dk
k
qda
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e
qdq ×
∂
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∂
∂
= . 
Note that 0, >
∂
∂
∂
∂
∀
a
q
e
q , 0<
∂
∂
k
q  and 0,, ≥∀ dkdade  since CSPPP ee ≥ , CSPPP aa ≥ , 
CSPPP kk ≥ . So, dq  can be either positive or negative depending on the concrete 
functions. It can be shown that 321 ,, dqdqdq∀  has the same sign as dq . Furthermore, 
)()( 00 CSPPP qBqB −  has the same sign as dq  since )(0 qB  increases. 
This leads us to conclusion that the gain of consumers from creating PPP is ambiguous 
and depends on the concrete functions. 
The trade-off between Compensatory Agreement and PPP 
Let’s find out how LA and RZD decide whether or not to enter PPP. 
Let’s make some notations. 
1111 IM −+=∏ π  is what agent gets under Compensatory Arrangements, where 
)()1( 31 fqCTqTq −−+= βπ  
)()()( 3333 qqTqqCTqqTqqCM pppp βςβς −×−−=+×−−=  
222 M+=∏ π  is what agent gets under PPP regime ( 2π  and 2M  are different from 1π  
and 1M ) 
It is easily seen from the previous analyses that 12 ∏>∏  
Now consider objective function of principal under Compensatory Arrangements. 
GMMTqB −−++− )(πµ  
Let’s denote the outcome (i.e. the value of this function after agent sets both levels of 
efforts and investments and principal sets level of control) as ),,(1 CSCSCS kaeSW  
The choice of “Compensatory Scheme versus PPP creation” presents a two options 
between the principal: leave the Compensatory Arrangements and get 
),,(1 CSCSCS kaeSW  or accept the PPP structure and get new variables of a , e  and k . 
Since when principal decides whether or not to construct the joint venture with RZD it 
uses objective function from current situation then the outcome that matters for 
principal is PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP kaeGMMBkaeSW ,,))((),,(2 −−++= πµ  
From analyzing of consumers’ situation we can analogically conclude that the change 
from Compensatory Arrangements to PPP is ambiguous from society’s point of view, 
nothing can be predicted without knowledge of the actual strategic functions. 
 
 
